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UCPR r 7 - power to extend time – UCPR r 667 – varying or setting 
aside costs orders –  whether general power in r 7 qualified by 
constraints in r 667 –  costs implications when unmeritorious issues 
advanced at trial 
 
In McIntosh & Anor as Trustees of the Estate of Camm (A Bankrupt) v 
Linke Nominees Pty Ltd & Anor [2008] QCA 410 the Queensland Court 
of Appeal considered the extent of the court’s power under r 7(1) of the 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”) to extend time, and 
in particular whether the rule applied so as to permit extension of the 
period specified under rule 667 for varying or setting aside an order.  
 
The case also provides an illustration of circumstances in which the court 
might be expected to depart from the general principle that a successful 
litigant is entitled to the costs of the litigation.  
 
Facts 
 
On 12 September 2008 the Court of Appeal ordered that the second 
defendant/appellant’s appeals be allowed, that orders made at first 
instance be set aside, and that the plaintiff/respondents pay the appellant’s 
costs of the proceedings, including the costs of the appeal.  
 
A legal representative of the respondents was present in court, but did not 
request that the respondents be permitted to make submissions on costs. 
On 15 September 2008 the respondents’ solicitors wrote to the solicitors 
for the appellant, advising of the respondents’ intention to make 
application for a variation of the costs order.  
 
The order was taken out and filed on 15 September 2008, and on 19 
September the respondents made application by filing an outline of 
submissions to vary the costs order to a fractional costs order only.  
 
The Court of Appeal was required to consider whether it had power under 
r 7(1) of the UCPR to extend time in the circumstances, or alternatively 
whether a variation of the order was warranted or capable of 
determination on the material before the court. 
 
Legislation 
 
Rule 7 of the UCPR provides: 
Extending and shortening time 
7(1) The court may, at any time, extend a time set under these rules 
or by order. 
(2) If a time set down under these rules or by order, including a 
time for service, has not ended, the court may shorten the time. 
 
Rule 667 of the UCPP provides, so far as relevant: 
 Setting Aside 
667 (1) The court may vary or set aside an order before the earlier 
of the following –  
(a) the filing of the order; or 
(b) the end of 7 days after the making of the order. 
 
(2) The Court may set aside an order at an time if – 
… 
 
Submissions 
 
The respondents based the application on rules 7, 667 and 388 (mistakes 
in orders or certificates) of the UCPR. 
 
It was submitted for the appellant that r 667, by making express provision 
for the time in which an order may be varied or set aside, and by 
providing specific exceptions conferring power on the Court to set aside 
an order at any time, allowed no scope for the operation of r 7(1).  
 
Reliance was placed in this regard on the views of Gavan Duffy CJ and 
Dixon J in Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and 
Allied Trade Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1 at 7, and of Dixon J in 
The King v Wallis (1949) 78 CLR 529 at 550. 
 
The appellants argued in the alternative that no variation of the order was 
warranted or capable of determination on the material before the court.  
 
The points raised on behalf of the appellant in that regard included the 
absence of any particularity in the submissions for the respondent as to 
the time taken in the trial on defences upon which the defendants failed, 
or as to the costs in preparation for the trial which might be attributed to 
these matters. It was argued that in the absence of such material the Court 
could not properly make a fractional costs order.  
 
 
Analysis 
 
Muir JA, with whose reasons Cullinane and Douglas JJ agreed, noted that 
the power in r 7(1) was unqualified, and found no good reason to 
conclude that it did not permit a court to extend the seven day period.  
 
The failure of the parties’ representatives to raise the question of costs 
when the judgment was handed down was not regarded as a disqualifying 
factor. Muir JA said in that context (at [10]): “The Court’s role is to 
decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they 
make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in 
accordance with their rights.”  
 
Muir J also accepted that there was force in the submission for the 
appellant in relation to the lack of detail provided by the respondent about 
the time taken at trial on defences which did not succeed. He was 
satisfied, however, that on an assessment generous to the appellant, the 
matters which succeeded both at first instance and on appeal were 
unlikely to have consumed more than one-third of the time spent in the 
evidence or more than one-third of the costs of preparation for trial.  
 
He was also satisfied that matters unsuccessfully raised appeared to have 
been unmeritorious. As they were substantive issues, it was appropriate to 
have regard to them in framing the appropriate costs order. He was 
satisfied that the disproportionate amount of time consumed on the trial 
by unmeritorious issues justified a departure from the normal order. 
 
As it possible in the circumstances to make a broad assessment only, it 
was necessary to ensure the appellant was not deprived of costs as a result 
of conjecture and/or speculation. It was concluded that the appropriate 
order was that the respondents pay one-half of the appellant’s costs at 
first instance, including reserved costs, if any, and the whole of the 
appellant’s costs of the appeal. 
 
Comment 
 
The decision serves as reminder that although the general principle 
relating to costs, both at general law and as expressed in r 681 of the 
UCPR, is that costs follow the event, costs are always in the discretion of 
the court. There are a range of circumstances in which it may be 
appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to make a different 
order. Parties’ representatives should address their minds to the question 
of costs, and in appropriate cases raise the issue of costs when the 
judgment is handed down.  
 
As acknowledged in the Court of Appeal, the time limit imposed in r 
667(1) reflects public policy which favours certainty and finality in 
litigation. The court might be expected to exercise the power under r 7(1) 
to extend that time limit with considerable caution. Despite the Court of 
Appeal’s willingness to extend time in this case, a failure to make  
submissions about costs in a timely way clearly involves significant risk. 
  
 
